An ideal vision model accounts for behavior and neurophysiology in both naturalistic conditions and designed lab experiments. Unlike psychological theories, artificial neural networks (ANNs) actually perform visual tasks and generate testable predictions for arbitrary inputs. These advantages enable ANNs to engage the entire spectrum of the evidence. Failures of particular models drive progress in a vibrant ANN research program of human vision.

In order for artificial intelligent systems to interact naturally with human users, they need to be able to learn from human instructions when actions should be imitated. Human tutoring will typically consist of action demonstrations accompanied by speech. In the following, the characteristics of human tutoring during action demonstration will be examined. A special focus will be put on the distinction between two kinds of motion events: path-oriented actions and manner-oriented actions. Such a distinction is inspired by the literature pertaining (...) to cognitive linguistics, which indicates that the human conceptual system can distinguish these two distinct types of motion. These two kinds of actions are described in language by more path-oriented or more manner-oriented utterances. In path-oriented utterances, the source, trajectory, or goal is emphasized, whereas in manner-oriented utterances the medium, velocity, or means of motion are highlighted. We examined a video corpus of adult–child interactions comprised of three age groups of children—pre-lexical, early lexical, and lexical—and two different tasks, one emphasizing manner more strongly and one emphasizing path more strongly. We analyzed the language and motion of the caregiver and the gazing behavior of the child to highlight the differences between the tutoring and the acquisition of the manner and path concepts. The results suggest that age is an important factor in the development of these action categories. The analysis of this corpus has also been exploited to develop an intelligent robotic behavior—the tutoring spotter system—able to emulate children's behaviors in a tutoring situation, with the aim of evoking in human subjects a natural and effective behavior in teaching to a robot. The findings related to the development of manner and path concepts have been used to implement new effective feedback strategies in the tutoring spotter system, which should provide improvements in human–robot interaction. (shrink)

Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. Dispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation.

The global pandemic needs to mark a turning point for the peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand. How can we make sure that our culturally diverse nation charts an equitable and sustainable path through and beyond this new world? In a less affluent future, how can we ensure that all New Zealanders have fair access to opportunities? One challenge is to preserve the sense of common purpose so critical to protecting each other in the face of Covid-19. How can we centre (...) what we have learnt about resilience within Māori and wider Pacific communities in our reforms? How can public understanding of Covid-19 science create a platform for the future social valuing of expertise? How can we ensure that the impact of Covid-19 in New Zealand results in a more sustainable, and inclusive workforce–for instance by expanding our perceptions of the value of our workers through promoting digital inclusion? To meet these challenges, we must reimagine our existing traditions of thought, breathing new life into perennial concepts and debates. Our paper indicates some of the ways that Philosophy is central to this collective reimagining, highlighting solutions to be found across our rich philosophical traditions. (shrink)

Since its conception nearly 20 years ago, Logic Programming - the idea of using logic as a programming language - has been developed to the point where it now plays an important role in areas such as database theory, artificial intelligence and software engineering. However, there are still many challenging research issues to be addressed and the UK branch of the Association for Logic Programming was set up to provide a forum where the flourishing research community could discuss important issues (...) of Logic Programming which were often by-passed at the large international conferences. This volume contains the twelve papers which were presented at the ALPUK's 3rd conference which was held in Edinburgh, 10-12 April 1991. The aim of the conference was to give a broad but detailed technical insight into the work currently being done in this field, both in the UK and by researchers as far afield as Canada and Bulgaria. The breadth of interest in this area of Computer Science is reflected in the range of the papers which cover - amongst other areas - massively parallel implementation, constraint logic programming, circuit modelling, algebraic proof of program properties, deductive databases, specialised editors and standardisation. The resulting volume gives a good overview of the current progress being made in the field and will be of interest to researchers and students of any aspects of logic programming, parallel computing or database techniques and management. (shrink)

Understanding how people comprehend visual narratives (including picture stories, comics, and film) requires the combination of traditionally separate theories that span the initial sensory and perceptual processing of complex visual scenes, the perception of events over time, and comprehension of narratives. Existing piecemeal approaches fail to capture the interplay between these levels of processing. Here, we propose the Scene Perception & Event Comprehension Theory (SPECT), as applied to visual narratives, which distinguishes between front-end and back-end cognitive processes. Front-end processes occur (...) during single eye fixations and are comprised of attentional selection and information extraction. Back-end processes occur across multiple fixations and support the construction of event models, which reflect understanding of what is happening now in a narrative (stored in working memory) and over the course of the entire narrative (stored in long-term episodic memory). We describe relationships between front- and back-end processes, and medium-specific differences that likely produce variation in front-end and back-end processes across media (e.g., picture stories vs. film). We describe several novel research questions derived from SPECT that we have explored. By addressing these questions, we provide greater insight into how attention, information extraction, and event model processes are dynamically coordinated to perceive and understand complex naturalistic visual events in narratives and the real world. (shrink)

Humans discount rewards as a function of the delay to their receipt. This tendency is referred to as delay discounting and has been extensively researched in the last decades. The magnitude effect and the trait effect are two phenomena which have been consistently observed for a variety of reward types. Here, we wanted to investigate if these effects also occur in the context of the novel but widespread reward types of Instagram followers and likes and if delay discounting of these (...) outcomes is related to self-control and Instagram screen time. In a within-subject online experiment, 214 Instagram users chose between smaller, immediate and larger, delayed amounts of hypothetical money, Instagram followers and likes. First, we found that the magnitude effect also applies to Instagram followers and likes. Second, delay discounting of all three reward types was correlated, providing further evidence for a trait influence of delay discounting. Third, no relationships were found between delay discounting and self-control as well as Instagram screen time, respectively. However, a user’s average like count was related to delay discounting of Instagram likes. (shrink)

For centuries, humanists have celebrated and cherished the limitless potential of humankind and its irrepressible spirit. For its efforts to develop rational solutions to human problems rather than invoking supernatural intervention, humanism has been rewarded with a rich and distinguished heritage whose contributors include many of the brightest minds of intellectual history. Advocating reason, critical intelligence, free and objective inquiry, democratic institutions, and moral values based on human experience, humanism stands in steadfast opposition to the moral, political, and social oppression (...) perpetrated by all who would have us swear unquestioned allegiance to authoritarian power, be it temporal or divine. But if humanism is to remain fresh and vibrant, alert and ever vigilant, it must continuously assess and evaluate its goals in light of new experience. In The Question of Humanism, 23 contributors investigate the meaning of humanism today, its range of perspectives, and how humanists can deal with the challenges of contemporary life and those it will face as the new century approaches. This absorbing collection of original essays examines the abundant variety of historical and contemporary humanist philosophies, with special emphasis on the work of Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant, Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Michel Foucault. Focusing on the need for an awareness of humanist tradition, these essays offer blunt, progressive self-appraisals to illustrate how humanism will continue to grow as a vital and compelling intellectual force. Featured are essays by Cecil Abrahams, Zygmunt Adamczewski, Samuel Ajzenstat, Martin Andic, Allan Booth, Richard Brown, Michael Cardy, Kenneth Dorter, Richard Francis, David Goicoechea, Danny Goldstick, Calvin Hayes, Marsha Hewitt, Monica Hornyansky, Paul Kurtz, James Lawler, John Luik, Robert McLaughlin, Graeme Nicholson, Zaid Orudjev, Robert Perkins, Charles Scott, and Edward A. Synan. The challenges of the past have served to strengthen humanists' resolve. Humanism, in all of its variations, is now ready for a new era. (shrink)

Labor and Global Justice combines conceptual and theoretical perspectives across a multiplicity of relevant differences, both geographical and disciplinary, to develop a transnational perspective on labor and justice and to make clear how justice requires a rethinking of the relation between labor and global capital.

The microbiome of human hair follicles (HFs) has emerged as an important player in different HF and skin pathologies, yet awaits in‐depth exploration. This raises questions regarding the tightly linked interactions between host environment, nutrient dependency of host‐associated microbes, microbial metabolism, microbe‐microbe interactions and host immunity. The use of simple model systems facilitates addressing generally important questions and testing overarching, therapeutically relevant principles that likely transcend obvious interspecies differences. Here, we evaluate the potential of the freshwater polyp Hydra, to dissect (...) fundamental principles of microbiome regulation by the host, that is the human HF. In particular, we focus on therapeutically targetable host‐microbiome interactions, such as nutrient dependency, microbial interactions and host defence. Offering a new lens into the study of HF – microbiota interactions, we argue that general principles of how Hydra manages its microbiota can inform the development of novel, microbiome‐targeting therapeutic interventions in human skin disease. (shrink)

This paper compares the recently proposed Robust Full Computational Tree Logic to model robustness in concurrent systems with other computational tree logic -based logics. RoCTL* extends CTL* with the addition of the operators Obligatory and Robustly, which quantify over failure-free paths and paths with one more failure respectively. This paper focuses on examining the succinctness and expressiveness of RoCTL* by presenting translations to and from RoCTL*. The core result of this paper is to show that RoCTL* is expressively equivalent to (...) CTL* but is non-elementarily more succinct. That is, RoCTL* does not add any expressive power over CTL*, but can represent some properties using vastly reduced formulae. We present a translation from RoCTL* into CTL* that preserves truth but may result in non-elementary growth in the length of the translated formula, as each nested Robustly operator may result in an extra exponential blowup. However, we show that this translation is optimal in the sense th.. (shrink)

Connectionist models offer concretemechanisms for cognitive processes. When these modelsmimic the performance of human subjects theycan offer insights into the computationswhich might underlie human cognition. We illustratethis with the performance of a recurrentconnectionist network which produces the meaningof words in response to their spellingpattern. It mimics a paradoxical pattern oferrors produced by people trying to read degradedwords. The reason why the network produces thesurprising error pattern lies in the nature ofthe attractors which it develops as it learns tomap spelling patterns (...) to semantics. The keyrole of attractor structure in the successfulsimulation suggests that the normal adult semanticreading route may involve attractor dynamics, andthus the paradoxical error pattern isexplained. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 5, May 2022.

I defend a sensitive neo-Moorean invariantism, an epistemological account with the following characteristic features: (a) it reserves a place for a sensitivity condition on knowledge, according to which, very roughly, S’s belief that p counts as knowledge only if S wouldn’t believe that p if p were false; (b) it maintains that the standards for knowledge are comparatively low; and (c) it maintains that the standards for knowledge are invariant (i.e., that they vary neither with the linguistic context of the (...) subject of knowledge nor with the linguistic context of the attributor of knowledge). I argue that this sort of account allows us to respond adequately to some difficult puzzles in epistemology, puzzles such as skeptical puzzles, as well as puzzles that inspire epistemological contextualism. I also maintain that by utilizing what Keith DeRose calls a warranted assertibility maneuver, sensitive neo-Moorean invariantism can account for our epistemic judgments in each of these puzzle cases. (shrink)

We show that the Lascar group $\operatorname {Gal}_L$ of a first-order theory T is naturally isomorphic to the fundamental group $\pi _1|)$ of the classifying space of the category of models of T and elementary embeddings. We use this identification to compute the Lascar groups of several example theories via homotopy-theoretic methods, and in fact completely characterize the homotopy type of $|\mathrm {Mod}|$ for these theories T. It turns out that in each of these cases, $|\operatorname {Mod}|$ is aspherical, i.e., (...) its higher homotopy groups vanish. This raises the question of which homotopy types are of the form $|\mathrm {Mod}|$ in general. As a preliminary step towards answering this question, we show that every homotopy type is of the form $|\mathcal {C}|$ where $\mathcal {C}$ is an Abstract Elementary Class with amalgamation for $\kappa $ -small objects, where $\kappa $ may be taken arbitrarily large. This result is improved in another paper. (shrink)

This paper addresses the motivations behind farmers’ pesticide use in two regions of Bangladesh. The paper considers farmers’ knowledge of arthropods and their perceptions about pests and pest damage, and identifies why many farmers do not use recommended pest management practices. We propose that using the novel approach of classifying farmers according to their motivations and constraints rather than observed pesticide use can improve training approaches and increase farmers’ uptake and retention of more appropriate integrated pest management technologies.

Although there are various studies comparing Greek and Indian philosophy and religion, and Chinese and Western philosophy and religion, Brahman and Dao: Comparatives Studies in Indian and Chinese Philosophy and Religion is a first of its kind that brings together Indian and Chinese philosophies and religions. Brahman and Dao helps close the gap on a much needed examination on the rich history of Buddhist transmission to China, and the many generations of Indian Buddhist missionaries to China and Chinese Buddhist pilgrims (...) to India, including the legendary Bodhidharma, and Faxian and Xuanzang. (shrink)

We argue against the halving response to Sleeping Beauty. First, we outline an appealing constraint on probability assignments: the Principle of Irrelevant Information. Roughly, this says: if you don’t know whether C, but you would assign probability p to X regardless of whether C or not-C, then you should assign p to X. This Principle is deeply plausible, but we show that it contradicts halving. Second, we show that halving either violates solid statistical reasoning or draws absurd distinctions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 10.2 (2005) 175-194 [Access article in PDF] Measure for Measure The Reliance of Human Knowledge on the Things of the World Tim Adamson When all things were in disorder, God created in each thing in relation to itself, and in all things in relation to each other, all the measures and harmonies which they could possibly receive. —Plato, Timaeus (69b) Is my body a thing, (...) is it an idea? It is neither, being the measurant of the things. We will therefore have to recognize an ideality that is not alien to the flesh, that gives it its axes, its depth, its dimensions. —Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968, 152) The search for truths differs from the search for truth criteria in more ways than those that are immediately obvious. —M. C. Dillon (1997, 9) The notion that all knowledge is a form of measurement can be traced back to the Socratic insight that knowledge requires the presence of some standard against which things are measured. We cannot account for our knowledge of things, Socrates argued, without appealing to some prior capacity we have for recognizing, comparing, or measuring things in terms of something else, for example, a concept or definition. In the modern era, Kant extended this insight to include perception as such, [End Page 175] arguing that even though our perceptual experience seems to be direct and immediate, upon reflection we know that some process of mediation must be at work which enables us to have a stable experience of objects. Faced with such insights, we are compelled to ask how such measuring is possible. If experience and knowledge rely on some capacity for measurement, what is measurement and what does it entail?The most common contemporary answer to this question can be found in notion that our experience and knowledge are "constructed" by distinctly human, that is, cultural factors. Having abandoned Kant's notion of a priori knowledge and its various Idealist offshoots, contemporary constructivism nonetheless maintains that cultural structures (although not fixed or permanent ones) serve as the basic principles upon which experience and knowledge are built. Such a view has some merit, insofar as it enables us to acknowledge the mediated character of our experience, while also avoiding the problematic claims of traditional idealism. But as appealing as this view is, it raises the question of the place and role of nature in our experience. From a constructivist point of view, although we may acknowledge that our experience and knowledge depend in crucial ways upon natural elements and events, it can often seem naive to discuss the role of such natural factors within experience—except, that is, as we admit that nature itself is "constructed" by culture, for example, language, conceptual systems, theoretical constructs, ideology, political power, institutional practices, and so forth. That is, although we no longer accord cultural factors an a priori or absolute status, we remain convinced that in fact cultural norms play the final, determining role in shaping our experience. In the end, we have come to believe, it is culture that measures and defines nature, not vice versa.My aim in this essay is to articulate an alternative view of the measurement involved in human experience and knowledge, one which helps us to overcome the privileging of culture over nature that still plagues contemporary thought. My account is inspired by Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body, particularly his notion that the human body serves as a "measurant of things." There are two key components of this claim. First, it describes the body's general capacity for measurement, and does not appeal to any specific measure or standard of measurement. As a measurant, the body is not any particular measure; rather, it is a thing that measures, an element of the natural world that brings measurement to the [End Page 176] things it encounters, thus bringing meaning into our experience. Second, the body's capacity to measure shows how our natural being as bodies is inherently meaningful, because measurement is, as we shall see... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 10.2 (2005) 175-194 [Access article in PDF] Measure for Measure The Reliance of Human Knowledge on the Things of the World Tim Adamson When all things were in disorder, God created in each thing in relation to itself, and in all things in relation to each other, all the measures and harmonies which they could possibly receive. —Plato, Timaeus (69b) Is my body a thing, (...) is it an idea? It is neither, being the measurant of the things. We will therefore have to recognize an ideality that is not alien to the flesh, that gives it its axes, its depth, its dimensions. —Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968, 152) The search for truths differs from the search for truth criteria in more ways than those that are immediately obvious. —M. C. Dillon (1997, 9) The notion that all knowledge is a form of measurement can be traced back to the Socratic insight that knowledge requires the presence of some standard against which things are measured. We cannot account for our knowledge of things, Socrates argued, without appealing to some prior capacity we have for recognizing, comparing, or measuring things in terms of something else, for example, a concept or definition. In the modern era, Kant extended this insight to include perception as such, [End Page 175] arguing that even though our perceptual experience seems to be direct and immediate, upon reflection we know that some process of mediation must be at work which enables us to have a stable experience of objects. Faced with such insights, we are compelled to ask how such measuring is possible. If experience and knowledge rely on some capacity for measurement, what is measurement and what does it entail?The most common contemporary answer to this question can be found in notion that our experience and knowledge are "constructed" by distinctly human, that is, cultural factors. Having abandoned Kant's notion of a priori knowledge and its various Idealist offshoots, contemporary constructivism nonetheless maintains that cultural structures (although not fixed or permanent ones) serve as the basic principles upon which experience and knowledge are built. Such a view has some merit, insofar as it enables us to acknowledge the mediated character of our experience, while also avoiding the problematic claims of traditional idealism. But as appealing as this view is, it raises the question of the place and role of nature in our experience. From a constructivist point of view, although we may acknowledge that our experience and knowledge depend in crucial ways upon natural elements and events, it can often seem naive to discuss the role of such natural factors within experience—except, that is, as we admit that nature itself is "constructed" by culture, for example, language, conceptual systems, theoretical constructs, ideology, political power, institutional practices, and so forth. That is, although we no longer accord cultural factors an a priori or absolute status, we remain convinced that in fact cultural norms play the final, determining role in shaping our experience. In the end, we have come to believe, it is culture that measures and defines nature, not vice versa.My aim in this essay is to articulate an alternative view of the measurement involved in human experience and knowledge, one which helps us to overcome the privileging of culture over nature that still plagues contemporary thought. My account is inspired by Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body, particularly his notion that the human body serves as a "measurant of things." There are two key components of this claim. First, it describes the body's general capacity for measurement, and does not appeal to any specific measure or standard of measurement. As a measurant, the body is not any particular measure; rather, it is a thing that measures, an element of the natural world that brings measurement to the [End Page 176] things it encounters, thus bringing meaning into our experience. Second, the body's capacity to measure shows how our natural being as bodies is inherently meaningful, because measurement is, as we shall see... (shrink)

Tim Blanning & Hagen Schulze: IntroductionJames Sheehan: Art and its Publics, c. 1800Silke Leopold: The Idea of National Opera around 1800John Deathridge: The Invention of German Music, c. 1800Peter Alter: Playing with the Nation: Napoleon and the Culture of NationalismSiegfried Weichlein: Cosmopolitanism, Patriotism, NationalismPeter Mandler: Art in a Cool Climate: The Cultural Policy of the British State in European Context, c. 1780- c. 1850Otto Dann: The Invention of National LanguagesHans-Erich Bödeker: The Debates about Universal History and National History around 1800: (...) A Problem-oriented Historical AttemptVincent Morley: Views of the Past in Irish Vernacular Literature, 1650-1850. (shrink)

Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness (‘C-tests’) are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no (...) C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them. (shrink)

Many passages in early Confucian texts such as the Analects and Mengzi are focused on virtue, recommending qualities like humaneness (ren 仁), righteousness (yi 義), and trustworthiness (xin 信). Still others emphasize roles: what it means to be a good son, a good ruler, a good friend, a good teacher, or a good student. How are these teachings about virtues and roles related? In the past decade there has been a growing debate between two interpretations of early Confucian ethics, one (...) that sees virtues as fundamental, and the other of which starts from roles. Recently there have been two new contributions to the debate: Virtue Ethics and Confucianism (2013), edited by Stephen C. Angle and Michael Slote, which develops the virtue ethical interpretation, and Henry Rosemont, Jr.’s Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion (2015), which defends the role-based interpretation. This paper lays out the main contours of the debate between Virtue Ethical Confucianism and Confucian Role Ethics, as well as examines the distinctive contributions of these two new works. (shrink)

In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction between the immediate data ‘which are presented or given to the mind’ and the ‘construction or interpretation’ which the mind brings to those data (1929: 52). What the mind receives is the datum – literally, the given – and the interpretation is what happens when we being it ‘under some category or other, select from it, emphasise aspects of it, and relate it in particular and unavoidable ways’ (...) (1929: 52). So although any attempt to describe the given will inevitably be an interpretation of it, this should not give us reason to deny its existence: ‘no-one but a philosopher could for a moment deny this immediate presence in consciousness of that which no activity of thought can create or alter’ (1929: 53). Whatever those outside philosophy might think, Lewis was certainly right about what philosophers were prepared to deny. His conception of the ‘given’ is without question one of the targets of Wilfrid Sellars’s influential critique of the notion of the ‘whole framework of givenness’ (1957).1 One of the things Sellars was attacking was the idea that something that was merely given by the senses could put one in a position to be justified in making a judgement about the empirical world. The.. (shrink)

This initial volume in a series of new translations of Plato’s works includes a general introduction and interpretive comments for the dialogues translated: the _Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Gorgias, _and _Menexenus. _ _ _“Allen’s work is very impressive. The translations are readable, lucid, and highly accurate. The general introduction is succinct and extremely clear. The discussion of the dating of the dialogues is enormously useful; there has previously been no brief account of these issues to which one could refer the (...) student. Finally, the particular introductions are first rate: fine jobs of clear philosophical and historical explanation—succinct and yet sophisticated, both close to the text and philosophically incisive.”—Martha Nussbaum, _Brown University_ “This is an important work that deserves our respect and attention.”—_Ethics _ _ _“This and the promised succeeding volumes will probably become the standard English version of the complete dialogues…. The commentaries take advantage of the best scholarship, judge judiciously between divergent views, and often introduce new and brilliant interpretations. This is true both in the area of philosophy and in that of literary criticism.”—Anthony C. Daly, S.J., _Modern Schoolman_ _ _“Allen is a superb translator, whose elegantly simple yet precise language gives access to Plato both as a philosopher and as a literary artist.”—_Library Journal__ _ “An important event in the world of scholarship.”—_London Review of Books_ _ _R.E. Allen is professor of classics and philosophy at Northwestern University. (shrink)

Synthetic biology is often described as a project that applies rational design methods to the organic world. Although humans have influenced organic lineages in many ways, it is nonetheless reasonable to place synthetic biology towards one end of a continuum between purely ‘blind’ processes of organic modification at one extreme, and wholly rational, design-led processes at the other. An example from evolutionary electronics illustrates some of the constraints imposed by the rational design methodology itself. These constraints reinforce the limitations of (...) the synthetic biology ideal, limitations that are often freely acknowledged by synthetic biology’s own practitioners. The synthetic biology methodology reflects a series of constraints imposed on finite human designers who wish, as far as is practicable, to communicate with each other and to intervene in nature in reasonably targeted and well-understood ways. This is better understood as indicative of an underlying awareness of human limitations, rather than as expressive of an objectionable impulse to mastery over nature. (shrink)

A range of extremely plausible moral principles turn out to generate “deontic cycling”: sets of actions wherein I have stronger reason to do B than A, C than B, and A than C. Indeed, just about anything recognizable as commonsense morality generates deontic cycling. This matters for two reasons. First, it creates a problem for the widely held view that agent-centered rankings can square consequentialism with commonsense morality. Second, it forces a choice between some deeply plausible views about rationality—wherein someone (...) cannot have stronger reason to do A than B, B than C, and C than A—and commonsense morality. (shrink)

Michael and has argued that species have intrinsic essences. This paper rebuts Devitt’s arguments, but in so doing it shores up the anti-essentialist consensus in two ways that have more general interest. First, species membership can be explanatory even when species have no essences; that is, Tamsin’s membership of the tiger species can explain her stripyness, without this committing us to any further claim about essential properties of tigers. Second, even the views of species that appear most congenial to essentialism—namely (...) phenetic and genotypic cluster accounts—do not entail strong forms of intrinsic essentialism. (shrink)

So, C. I don’t know that T. Premises 1 and 2 are both plausible. However, C seems false—I do seem to know that there is a tree before me. AI presents a puzzle because its two plausible premises yield a conclusion whose negation is plausible. And no matter whether we accept or reject AI, we find that we must give up something plausible—either premise 1, premise 2, or the negation of C. But which of these should we give up? I (...) call this question the skeptical puzzle.1 Recently, Mark Heller2 has argued that we can solve the skeptical puzzle by giving up premise 2. I argue, however, that Heller does not adequately respond to an objection to his proposed solution. I go on to argue that we can solve the skeptical puzzle by giving up premise 1. (shrink)

L’atmosphère« Atmosphère » est un terme employé communément par des auteurs dans le domaine de l’esthétique que dans celui de la météorologie. Ils le comprennent pourtant de manière assez différente, chacun prétendant que leur emploi est la plus fondamentale et que l’autre est seulement métaphorique. Pour les esthéticiens, l’atmosphère réelle est une aura qui émane des choses et qui affecte nos humeurs et nos motivations; pour les météorologistes, il s’agit de l’enveloppe gazeuse qui entoure la planète. Je montre que les (...) deux sens excluent l’air ou le réduisent à un éther immatériel. D’une part, pour la science météorologique, tout se passe comme l’air était enfermé à l’intérieur et considéré comme un ensemble d’effets mesurables et calculables. D’autre part,l’esthétique de l’affect a relié l’atmosphère aux formes solides des artéfacts et des paysages. En ramenant le medium aérien, je cherche une signification de l’atmosphère qui transcende l’opposition entre l’affectif et le météorologique. Je le fais en suivant Merleau-Ponty, qui traite l’atmosphère comme un espace d’inspiration et d’expiration. En tant que tel, il correspond étroitement à ce que Merleau-Ponty lui-même appelle la « chair ». Ce concept pourrait aussi être traduit par « meshwork » (réseau/filet/grillage), référant à ces faisceaux de lignes et de chemins par lesquels chaque être humain est cousu à la fabrique du monde. Pour Merleau-Ponty, la portée de la notion de chair réside dans l’affirmation que la perception est fondamentalement réversible. On ne peut être sentant que dans un monde sentant; c’est pourquoi, comme il le soutient, notre perception des choses dans l’environnement répond à la perception par l’environnementde notre soi. Cependant, je soutiens au contraire que ces deux mouvements d’inspiration et d’expiration ne sont pas le contraire exact l’un de l’autre. Comme le mouvement de la brasse en nataion, le premier est un mouvement de rassemblement et le second de propulsion. Nous inhalons l’atmosphère, mais nous exhalons selon les lignes du réseau. Bref, réseau et atmosphère sont deux côtés de la chair, et c’est dans leur alternance rythmique que nous trouvons la relation entre les lignes et le temps météorologique, qui est, comme je le soutiens, fondamental à la vie.L’atmosfera‘Atmosfera’ è una parola usata comunemente tanto da chi scrive di estetica come dai metereologi. Ciononostante, essi intendono con ciò delle cose piuttosto differenti, ognuno ritenendo che il proprio e il senso più fondamentale mentre l’altrui è meramente metaforico. Per chi si occupa di estetica, l’atmosfera reale è un’aura che emana dalle cose e affetta il nostro umore e le nostre motivazioni; per i metereologi è l’involucro gassoso che circonda il pianeta. Mostro come entrambi i sensi trascurano l’aria, o la riducono a un etere immateriale. Da una parte, per la scienza metereologica, è come se l’aria fosse stata portata al chiuso e presentata come una serie di effetti misurabili e calcolati. Dall’altra, l’estetica dell’affetto ha legato l’atmosfera alle forme solide degli artefatti e dei paesaggi.Nel reintrodurre l’ambiente aereo, intendo trovare un significato di atmosfera che trascenda l’opposizione tra i sensi affettivo e meteorologico. Faccio questo, seguendo Merleau-Ponty, trattando l’atmosfera come uno spazio di inalazione e esalazione. Come tale, corrisponde da vicino a ciò che Merleau-Ponty stesso chiama “la carne”. Ma questo concetto potrebbe anche essere tradotto come ‘reticolo’ (meshwork), riferendosi a quei grovigli di linee e percorsi lungo i quali ogni essere vivente è cucito al tessuto del mondo. Per Merleau-Ponty, il significato della carne risiede nella sua affermazione secondo la quale la percezione è fondamentalmente reversibile. Si può essere senzienti soltanto in un mondo senziente; quindi, ritiene il filosofo, la nostra percezione delle cose nell’ambienteè ricambiata dalla percezione che quest’ultimo ha di noi. Io mostro, al contrario, che questi due movimenti, corrispondenti all’inalazione e all’esalazione, non sono l’esatto rovescio l’uno dell’altro. Come nella bracciata a stile libero nel nuoto, il primo è un movimento di raccolta, il secondo un movimento di propulsione. Ovverossia, inaliamo l’atmosfera, ma esaliamo secondo le linee del reticolo. In breve, il reticolo e l’atmosfera sono due facce della carne, e troviamo nella loro alternanza ritmica la relazione tra le linee e il tempo che, come sostengo, è fondamentale alla vita. (shrink)